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Introduction 
 
Bart Cockx, Sherppa, Ghent University 
Bruno Van der Linden, FNRS and IRES, UCLouvain 
 
 
This E-book addresses one of the most hotly debated questions in the Belgian federation: To 
what extent should some federal labour market institutions be decentralized? “Labour market 
institutions” include formal organizations, laws, rules and policies that affect the functioning of 
the labour market. It starts with the point of view of the ministers Marcourt and 
Vandenbroucke (henceforth, MV) who are in charge of Employment in respectively the 
Walloon and the Flemish governments. This joint viewpoint appeared in newspapers on 
December 8, 2008. This viewpoint, briefly summarized in Section 1, establishes a list of 
institutions that should remain federal and, with a certain degree of precision, others that 
should be decentralized. The rest of the E-book is made of comments on this viewpoint. These 
comments are made by academics in economics and sociology and by the Minister Cerexhe 
who is in charge of employment in Brussels.  
 
1. The Marcourt-Vandenbroucke (MV) standpoint and a global appreciation of it 
The starting point of MV is that labour regulations, wage policy and the funding of Social 
Security and all its branches should remain within the competence of the federal authority. 
Then, the ministers pleads for a complete regionalization of a number of training and 
educational policies that have remained a federal competency up to now. They also propose to 
investigate whether other policies, such as ALE/PWA, outplacement1 and temporary work 
permits shouldn’t be regionalized. They call for a further simplification of the federal 
employment subsidy schemes targeted to specific workers and to gear it better to the specific 
regional needs.2 In fact, this point of view seems to be influenced by the general view that the 
Walloon Region is particularly hit by youth unemployment, whereas the Flemish Region faces 
the problem of low employment rates among older workers. Finally, MV call for a new funding 
scheme that would promote “incentives and accountability and take into account the needs 
and capacities of each government”. 
From the various comments found in this E-book, emerges a dominant view that broadly 
speaking the position paper of MV goes in the right direction. However, “the devil is in the 
details”. Put another way, an evaluation of these proposals requires that they be formulated in a 
precise way. Understandably, this is not the case yet, in particular with respect to the new 
funding scheme. Moreover, there is some disagreement on the opportunity of regionalizing 
some competencies and Minister Cerexhe argues that improvements are possible and needed 
within the current structure of competencies. Finally, in our contribution we argue that, even 
if a well-designed decentralization of labor market policy may improve the functioning of the 
labor market, it’s not the first and most important step.  We claim that the current priority is a 
structural reform of labour market institutions, independently of the issue of decentralization. 
We briefly explain why and what reform is more urgent, but the reader is referred for details to 
a companion paper.  
 
                                                       
1 Minister Cerexhe discusses explicitly the regionalization of outplacement.  
2 In particular, this refers to the recently much debated federal scheme of targeted wage subsidies. After the 
position paper of MV was written, this scheme was sharply reduced by the last inter-professional agreement 
among the social partners. Since then, this decision has been blocked by the Flemish government. It is also been 
criticized by Minister Cerexhe in his comment on the MV's position paper. Both argue that such targeted wage 
subsidies are needed to fight regional-specific problems of non-employment. 
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2. Major arguments and their implications 
In arguments for and against regionalization, the notions of “efficiency” and “equity” are key. 
We briefly clarify these notions for the reader who is not familiar with them. It is often thought 
that “efficiency” only refers to the utilisation of less resources to attain a given objective. While 
this “technical efficiency” is required, “efficiency” means more than that. Without entering 
into technicalities, “efficiency” means that nobody can be made better off without making 
someone else worse off. Put differently, an allocation of resources is inefficient if a change in 
this allocation would imply a gain for someone and no loss for others. When the environment 
presents randomness, in our context when there is a risk of being unemployed, “efficiency” 
requires that, loosely speaking, an additional euro has the same value in all possible positions 
occupied by an individual. “Equity” is a very complex notion, too. A basic requirement is “the 
equal treatment of identical citizens in comparable socio-economic situations, including their 
equal access to social protection” (Van Rompuy in this E-book). According to the preferred 
ethical perspective, more can be required: People with different endowments (talents, location 
of birth…) should be given the same “opportunities” (the precise measurement of it being of 
course crucial). 
This clarification being made, more decentralization should improve the balance between 
efficiency and equity in Belgium as a whole. It is then often argued that, in the case of the 
labour market, devolution is motivated by regional long-lasting disparities in unemployment 
and employment and by the need of creating more coherent packages of instruments to fight 
the regional-specific unemployment and the ageing problems. Our comment qualifies the 
importance of these disparities. Moreover, as stressed by several contributors to this E-book, the 
gain in coherency strongly depends on the details of the implementation.  
A common view found in the comments is that social security – from the perspective of 
efficiency – ought to remain a federal competence. This is also true for the labour market 
legislation and for the wage-setting institutions. About the latter, while Cantillon considers that 
“wage costs (…) are uniform throughout the federation”, Plasman et al argue that current 
wage-setting institutions “allow wages to adapt to regional productivity differences”. If more 
sensitivity of wages with respect to local conditions is needed, they add that current institutions 
already have regional sub-joint committees and that in addition more importance could be 
given to collective bargaining at the company level. 
Most of the commentators also agree with MV that policies aiming at reintegration of 
unemployed and of inactive workers in the labour market should be decentralized since they 
logically are part of a competency that has already been transferred to the Regional level. Such 
a reform should provide the Regional Public Employment Services (PES) with an enlarged 
and more coherent set of instruments. So, more efficiency can be expected by such a reform. 
As some of these policies are currently jointly organised by the federal authorities and the 
social partners, the role of the latter should be adjusted but the principle of their involvement 
is not questioned (a standpoint that seems to be shared by MV).   
More delicate is whether the Regions should be made responsible for the targeted wage 
subsidies and for the monitoring and sanctioning of job search, of job acceptance behaviour 
and of mandatory participation in active labour market policies (ALMP). It is often argued that 
federal wage subsidies directed to specific target groups should be regionalized, because this 
allows to accommodate these subsidies to the Regional labour market conditions. Our 
comment explains why this argument is flawed. Targeted wage subsidies are broadly of two 
types: Permanent or temporary. The first one, also called “structural”, should remain the 
competence of the federal level (this is claimed by us and can be deducted from the comment 
of Van Rompuy and Plasman et al). If it makes sense to regionalize any wage subsidy- this is 
not the view of Minister Cerexhe -, it would be the temporary targeted subsidies. The 
monitoring and the sanctioning of the unemployed should become a responsibility of the 
regions in the MV position paper, provided that rules remain defined at the federal level. 
There are good arguments to go in that direction. Still, some important complications should 
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be resolved to gain from such a reform (for further details, see our comment and the critical 
view of Minister Cerexhe on such a reform). 
Policies that affect the duration in unemployment (be it active programme or monitoring and 
sanctions) touch upon the federal social security scheme. Put differently, regional decisions 
induce “externalities” at the federal level. Hence, Cantillon calls for “consultation between the 
competent authorities”. To avoid that the socio-economic outcomes would further diverge 
between Regions, Cantillon stresses that common objectives should be defined and indicators 
of fulfilment of these objectives should be monitored, such as in the ‘Open Method of 
Coordination’ approved by the European Union. Cantillon argues that “the regions should be 
made fully aware of their financial accountability for federalized policy strategies”, but how 
remains an open question.  
Dewatripont, Van Rompuy and we believe, as MV, that, to bring about convergence in the 
Regional labour market performance, funding of the Regions on the basis of an explicit 
incentive scheme is desirable. Incentive contracts are required to resolve problems of 
conflicting interests. In the case we consider here, the conflicting interest is between the 
federal authority and the Regions. Essentially, the conflict is that unemployment benefits are 
paid and wage taxes and contributions are raised at the federal level, while a number of 
policies, in particular ALMP and education, that affect these expenditures and proceeds are a 
Regional competence. Since the Regions do not collect the full3 proceeds of their actions, they 
tend to under-invest in ALMP and education or do not care enough about their effectiveness. 
An incentive contract attempts to align the objective of the Regions to that of the federal 
authority by financially rewarding (or penalizing) Regional actions according to an indicator of 
performance that reflects the interests of the federal authority. As recognized by the 
commentators, the details of the design of this scheme are crucial.  
1. The choice of the indicator of performance. In principle, the indicator of performance 
could just be the sum of the savings generated by the reduced payments in 
unemployment benefits and the increased proceeds in terms of wage taxes and 
contributions generated by each Regions. In practise, it is, however, administratively too 
costly to measure these savings. This is why the commentators propose to relate 
incentive pay to indicators that are easier to measure, but that are still related to the 
generated savings. Two candidates are the Regional long-term unemployment rate4 (Van 
Rompuy) and the (full-time equivalent5) employment rate. All commentators agree, 
however, that the employment rate is a better candidate, since the unemployment rate 
can be “manipulated” by pushing unemployed workers into inactivity. 
2. Limit randomness of the indicator. Whatever the chosen indicator(s) of performance,  
one has to be aware that their evolution is not only affected by the regional interventions, 
but also by many external factors, such as the economic business cycle and policy at the 
other (federal, European,...) levels of competence. So, a benchmark is needed. Different 
viewpoints appear here. Principal candidates are a Belgian average, an average in 
surrounding countries.6 Even if there is not a clear agreement on the eventual choice of 
the benchmark, commentators seem to agree the scheme should be ‘win-win’, namely 
that every entity (federal and federated) actually benefits financially when employment 
                                                       
3 The Regional means already depend of economic indicators that are only partially correlated with the Regional 
employment level. Moreover, the Federal government already transfers means to finance some Regional labour 
market policies. It should be added that poor employment performances are detrimental to the image of a 
Region, with e.g. potential electoral implications. 
4 This is a measure of structural unemployment. As rightly pointed out by Dewatripont, “the relevant concept in 
this debate is that of ‘structural underemployment and/or unemployment’, not the big cyclical component of 
unemployment that we are starting to witness right now because of the financial crisis; this latter one has to be 
dealt with by macroeconomic policy coordinated at EU and even world level.” 
5 We propose this refinement as to avoid that the scheme would be “manipulated” by stimulating the creation of 
part-time employment. 
6 There is no clear agreement among commentators whether this average should be calculated prospectively (Van 
Rompuy) or retrospectively. 
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rates improve in any one region. This seems to exclude the first candidate in a pure 
form. 
Even if one reaches agreement over the benchmark, the question remains which Region 
should be rewarded (or penalized) for employment created (destroyed) in a Region 
where one does not live. Brussels e.g. attracts 360 000 workers from other Regions and 
61 000 inhabitants of Brussels work in the other Regions (Cerexhe, p. 15). Minister 
Cerexhe argues that, as a consequence, the Brussels Region does not  currently receive 
the funding it’s entitled to and that this needs to be resolved before discussing 
“accountability” in the Regional funding. In our contribution we propose a sharing rule 
to resolve this problem, but recognize that it’s very complicated to assign the appropriate 
shares in this rule, so that agreement on this point may be key in negotiations regarding 
the design of an incentive scheme in the funding of the Regions.  
3. The size and form of the bonus-malus. Since the performance indicator will never 
perfectly reflect the effort undertaken by the Regions, the transfer to the Region should 
not be related only to indicators of labour-market performance, but should partly consist 
of a lump-sum transfer. It is, however, difficult to objectively determine the optimal size 
of the bonus-malus, which therefore will be subject of intensive political debate 
(Dewatripont). To avoid ‘vicious circles’ in case a Region starts losing money as 
consequence of the incentive scheme, Dewatripont suggests to consider malusses in 
terms of obligations to intensify labour market policies rather than in terms of reduced 
financial resources. But this requires an objective measurement of the “intensity” 
assigned to labour market policies by a third party. Is this feasible? 
4. A neutral initial target. The employment rates between the different Regions will differ 
at the moment of the introduction of the scheme. Since the incentive scheme can only 
affect future actions, we argue that it should take past behaviour as given and normalize 
each Region’s indicator to the level attained at the moment at which the scheme is 
introduced. This boils down to measuring performance in terms of variation of the 
employment rate, instead of in absolute terms. 
 
3. Conclusion 
This collection of brief comments around the MV position paper hopefully paves the way of a 
more rational debate about decentralization of labour market policies in Belgium. Such a 
debate is unavoidable. Needless to say, much work remains to be done to help the decision 
making in this touchy domain.  
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A call for action and dialogue in the 
interest of economic recovery and 
social progress7 
Jean-Claude Marcourt, Employment Minister for the Walloon Region 
Frank Vandenbroucke, Employment Minister for the Flemish Region 
 
 
 
In the current economic and financial crisis the authorities should take direct and efficient 
action at all levels to reestablish the confidence of enterprises and citizens alike and to 
guarantee their social and financial security. At the European level, the Party of the European 
Socialists (PES) has just approved a recovery plan. We ask the member states and the 
European Union to urgently take proactive and coordinated measures through investment 
programs in order to preserve employment, avoid dismissals and develop a sustainable 
economy. In Wallonia and Flanders, our regional governments proposed ambitious recovery 
measures to facilitate the granting of credit to companies, to accelerate and to promote public 
and private investments in sustainable economic development, and to strengthen our labor 
market policies, especially for workers hit by restructuring. Together with the federal 
government we are constructively collaborating to the elaboration of a general short-term anti-
crisis plan. 
 
In the same constructive spirit, we also participated in the discussions that occurred within the 
framework of the inter-community dialogue. A debate on institutional reform is for us neither a 
fetish nor a taboo. Quite to the contrary, it is a way of guaranteeing in the long run the further 
development of both the federal state and the federated entities. We believe that, if each 
authority is given clearly circumscribed competencies, enhancing the federated entities’s 
capacity for action can go hand in hand with enhancing that of the federal authority. Each of 
the entities can thereby become more efficient, while the whole they form can become more 
coherent. 
 
We believe that what binds together both the authorities and all the citizens of this country is a 
strong and therefore sustainably financed Social Security system, i.e. one that guarantees, in 
particular, sound pensions and health care for all. To achieve this, we must make sure that 
more people are in work. As a point of departure, we assert that labour law, wage policy, the 
various branches and funding mechanisms of the Social Security system should remain a 
federal competence. On the other hand, the federated entities must be enabled to exercise all 
the competencies that are required in order for them to fulfill their main assignment with 
regard to employment, namely the active counseling and the following-up of job seekers and 
workers, including training (alternate work and study schemes, paid educational leave), taking 
the specificities of their respective labour markets into account. Thus, the general rules 
regarding suitable employment and exemption from availability for work remain federal, 
                                                       
7 The original version of this text appeared on December 8, 2008, simultaneously in Dutch (in De Standaard) and in 
French (in Le Soir). It can be downloaded from 
http://www.vlaanderen.be/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1227854145950&pagename=minister_frank_vandenb
roucke%2FArticle_C%2FArticlePageMIN&lang=NL and from 
http://www.vlaanderen.be/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1227854152573&pagename=minister_frank_vandenb
roucke%2FArticle_C%2FArticlePageMIN&lang=NL 
This English version is published under the sole responsibility of the Re-Bel initiative. 
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whereas their concrete implementation is performed by the regions, who have to make 
commitments to the federal authorities within this framework.  
 
In this connection, we would like to investigate whether there may be a point in regionalizing 
some measures of job matching and of employment, such as the Local Employment Offices 
(PWA/ALE), outplacement, the counseling of employees in the context of restructuring, and 
temporary work permits. As regards reductions in Social Security contributions and 
employment plans, we plead for a simplification of the current schemes and for better 
targeting, tailored to the regional realities. In this domain, however, we await the conclusions 
of the ongoing negotiations between the trade unions and employer organizations. 
 
In aforementioned reforms one obviously needs to take account of the customs of negotiation 
between the social partners. Lastly, a strengthening of the competencies of the regions and 
communities should be coupled with a funding scheme that combines incentives and 
accountability while taking the needs and capacities of each government into account and 
yielding a positive return on investment for both the regions as the federal authority.  
 
This is an outline of our position regarding the institutional reform of employment policy. A 
strengthening of regional labour market policy affords us a greater opportunity to collaborate in 
order to make our labour market more dynamic. But launching such dynamics requires 
unblocking the inter-community deadlock and resuming work within the framework of the 
inter-community dialogue. A new conflict between communities would be unacceptable, 
indeed irresponsible on the background of the present economic crisis. Finally, we consider 
that what we can achieve in this area should be achievable in other areas too.                
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On the regionalization of 
employment policy 
A response to the joint statement by 
Ministers Marcourt and 
Vandenbroucke  
 
Benoît Cerexhe, Employment Minister  for the Region of Brussels-Capital 
 
 
 
The regionalisation of employment is one of many topics that were discussed in the framework 
of institutional negotiations.  
 
I have been asked to respond to the joint statement issued at the end of 2008 by Mr Frank 
Vandenbroucke and Mr Jean-Claude Marcourt concerning this theme. 
 
I am making the present contribution to the debate in my position as the Regional Minister for 
Employment, outside of any negotiating context, on the basis of my experience of spending 
five years at the head of this department. 
 
I feel it necessary to start by mentioning that I have the impression that sometimes people 
forget that employment has already been regionalised to a large extent in this country.  
 
While the federal authorities are responsible for unemployment insurance and the 
employment law, and the Communities are responsible for training (this role has been 
transferred by the French Community to the Walloon Region and to COCOF as regards 
Brussels), the Regions bear the major responsibility as regards recruitment, return to work 
programmes for job-seekers who are not engaged in any activity, and the enforcement of 
standards regarding employment of foreign workers. I would like to emphasise that these are by 
no means minor matters. We are helping more than 96,000 Bruxellois to find work with Actiris, 
our Missions Locales and our local Werkwinkels, and our partners and the multiple instruments 
and tools we have put into place. The Regions therefore have considerable room for 
manoeuvre.  
 
When we speak of ‘regionalisation’, we are therefore speaking of the transfer of new 
responsibilities, which are at this moment dealt with at the federal level, to the Regions. 
 
When considering any transfer, whether total or partial, one needs to remember that 
employment is a sensitive subject, which needs to be handled with a certain degree of caution 
in my view. In fact, this competence, to the extent that it is linked to work and to social 
security, includes on the one hand a fundamental element of national and interpersonal 
solidarity, and is on the other closely linked to a federal model of social consultation. 
Employment therefore concerns the very foundations of our federal state. 
  
Within a historical context where there has often been a tendency to have multiple 
institutional reforms without necessarily causing those institutions to function better on every 
occasion, or to run our politics better, I do not believe that it is possible to transfer new 
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competences to the Regions unless this actually generates an ‘added value’. This would be the 
case if the transfer were to fulfil the following five criteria: 
 
• not to put at risk interpersonal solidarity, and to allow an acceptable degree of 
differentiation of policies in the Belgian state;  
• do everything first to make our existing tools work better; 
• ensure improved effectiveness of the service provided to our population; 
• there should be no alternative that more accurately reflects the specific nature of the 
Regions; 
• attach financial or human resources to this transfer, thus allowing the recipients to 
exercise this competence properly. 
 
 
1. Not to put at risk interpersonal solidarity, and to allow an acceptable degree of 
differentiation of policies in the Belgian state 
 
It appears essential to me that individual and collective employment laws should remain a 
federal matter. If there is going to be a reform, then it must not undermine interpersonal 
solidarity and in particular our social security system, or the federal model of social 
consultation. Apart from that, I leave it to the reader to imagine what the consequences would 
be of different policies in this area, above and beyond the inevitable complexity they would 
create! In the first place, such a situation would lead to competition between the Regions. 
Such a situation would also create complications for businesses that have set up in our country. 
Finally, this would go against any kind of logic, insofar as the numerous regulations originate 
from the Directives of the European Union. This means then that there cannot be any 
question of regionalising family benefits, unemployment benefits, the minimum wage or the 
reimbursement of medical treatment.  
 
 
2. Make our existing tools work better 
 
I am of the view that we are not making full use of the existing cooperation mechanisms. I am 
going to take two examples of this situation, one of which concerns relations between the 
Federal government and the Regions at the level of policies for reactivating job-seekers, and 
the other with regard to relations between the Regions at the level of mobility of job-seekers. 
Within these two examples, the Regions could benefit from greater autonomy or use their 
autonomy better, and more effectively, without necessarily transferring new competences to 
the Regions. 
 
As regards the first example, the Federal government and the Regions settled the arrangements 
for their collaboration in a cooperation agreement on 30 April 2004 as far as assisting job 
applicants. The Regions are responsible for assisting and placing job applicants, while the 
NEO (National Employment Office), a federal organisation, is in particular responsible for 
checking on the availability of job applicants. The unemployed receive benefits, but they have 
to be available to the labour market. This means that they cannot refuse a suitable position and 
that they have to actively look for work. The interpretation of ‘suitable employment’ has been 
determined according to a number of criteria that are determined at federal level.  
 
The current regulations mean that the regional employment service (Forem, VDAB, Actiris, 
Arbeitsambt) takes job-seekers’ availability into account when considering whether to send 
information. This can result, for example, in the NEO being notified if a job-seeker decides 
not to attend an interview with an employer. It is not up to the regional services to pass 
judgment on such an action. It is in fact the NEO (the federal agency) that interprets federal 
legislation with regard to availability, and it is therefore up to the NEO to decide whether an 
unemployed person is available and whether he or she is actively looking for work. Only NEO 
can impose a penalty for not being available, which usually happens after it has notified the 
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regional agency, on administrative grounds. It is also up to the NEO to exempt an unemployed 
person from having to be available, for example to undertake training or for social or family 
reasons.  There are also (federal) criteria in this regard. 
 
The fact that a federal agency monitors and penalises unemployed persons if they are 
unavailable is a guarantee that every job-seeker will receive equal treatment as regards their 
search for work. While labour markets and stratification of unemployment may vary, it is still 
necessary that monitoring and penalties should be handled at federal level, in the same way as 
labour legislation. 
 
This is also all the more true given that regionalisation of monitoring and penalties, under the 
pretext that the labour market within the three regions is not homogeneous, is not likely to 
solve many problems. Employment catchment areas are not homogeneous within a single 
region. One cannot compare the area of Vilvoorde with the area of Antwerp in terms of 
unemployment, in the way that one can compare the Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde area with 
Brabant Wallon. 
 
Employment catchment areas draw on potential workers well outside their regional 
boundaries. Brussels attracts some 360,000 workers from the other regions, while some 61,000 
of its inhabitants commute to jobs outside the city. How can one integrate this type of data in a 
regionalised approach, without then creating a protectionist response from the regions when 
there is heightened unemployment, which is the case at the moment? 
 
On the other hand, it would be entirely desirable to reinforce the 2004 agreement regarding 
policies for activating the unemployed as suggested by the Federal Ministry for Employment, 
while leaving greater autonomy for the Regions. A new activation process that grants the 
Regions greater autonomy (the job-seeker makes a contract with the regional adviser; the 
adviser is free to define the availability expected from the job-seeker; the NEO performs an 
evaluation using the database sent by the regional adviser, etc.) could contribute to solving the 
problem of differing labour markets, without resulting in differences in the treatment of job-
seekers. We can make our activities more effective by making our Contrat de Projet 
Professionnel (Professional Project Contract) stricter, while ensuring that the job-seeker is 
involved to the greatest degree in his or her support project, and shortening time limits for 
taking action by simplifying the procedures and formalities, but only on condition that 
additional financial resources are granted to the Region. It is important that the NEO should 
continue to monitor the uniform application of the regulations throughout Belgium.  
 
It is also important that - within the framework of this new agreement - the Regions should be 
able to define a suitable path that is either longer or more intensive for job-seekers who are 
further away from the labour market.  
 
As regards the second example, the Regions have the possibility of arranging how they work 
together in terms of a cooperation agreement. This hardly even happened until a few years ago. 
An agreement on the interregional mobility of job-seekers was concluded in 2005. This 
provides for an exchange of information between regional employment agencies concerning 
job vacancies relating to key positions and vacant positions that have not been filled for a 
certain period of time. The Brussels Capital Region recently concluded a specific agreement 
with the Flemish Region, starting from the principle that the unemployment rate is far lower 
on the outskirts of Brussels, where there are vacancies that cannot be filled. On the basis of this 
agreement, we have organised an exchange of vacancies between the two Regions within a 
certain area and achieved very good results in terms of filling positions. The number of 
Bruxellois who leave our Region to work in the outskirts of the capital has grown by 15% in four 
years! This is not that complex an initiative, and yet facilitating and encouraging mobility 
among job-seekers gets more people back into work. 
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The fact that existing agreements or those to be concluded allow for greater effectiveness 
without transferring new competences should not stop us from considering whether we should 
reinforce those agreements or make these forms of cooperation more flexible. 
 
Better coordination of competences has another aspect, namely refraining from pointless 
competition between Regions, which benefits nobody. It is also within this perspective that I 
would reject the regionalisation of corporation tax, which could even be damaging to our 
objectives. 
 
 
3. Improved effectiveness of the service provided 
 
I am one of those who believe that a policy has no purpose unless it increases the effectiveness 
of the service provided to the population and more particularly to our job-seekers. It seems to 
me that this should be our main concern as regards our actions. 
 
If we consider the entire body of competences for which we are responsible, we can see certain 
aspects here and there where we could achieve the ‘added value’ that could result from 
expanded regional competences. 
 
Let me give an example. 
 
At the level of outplacement, the Federal state must remain competent for employment law 
regulations as regards the right to professional reclassification (provisions contained in the 
collective employment agreement 82bis, rights and obligations of employees and employers, 
minimum conditions for granting outplacement and actual terms of outplacement, and 
penalties in the event of failure to comply). Then again, why is it not possible to consider 
making the Regions responsible for deciding on the actual terms of outplacement beyond the 
provisions set out in collective employment agreement 82bis, so they correspond more to the 
requirements and needs of our labour market, for issuing a compulsory recommendation with 
regard to support measures for workers who have been made redundant in the context of 
restructuring, so that the employer can be recognised as being in a process of restructuring 
(and so that workers can benefit from a pre-pension at an earlier age), as well as for allocating 
funds generated by fines imposed by the Federal state?  
 
I am keen to emphasise that this ‘added value’ deriving from greater regional responsibilities is 
not limited to the elements that would be transferred from the Federal level to the Regions, but 
also from the Communities to the Regions. Let me cite an example that is specific to Brussels 
as regards responsibility for Training. I am in favour of transferring the competence of the 
COCOF and the Flemish Community to the Brussels Capital Region. Let me repeat that 65% 
of job-seekers in Brussels have no more than a lower-secondary qualification and 90% of them 
are unilingual francophones. Assigning responsibility for training and recruitment to the same 
institutional authority would make it possible to offer shorter and better targeted training 
courses. This would be more effective in my view.  
 
 
4.  There should be no alternative that more accurately reflects the specific nature of the 
Regions 
 
A certain number of measures were passed in the 1980s with a view to reducing the level of 
employer contributions to reduce employers’ wage costs. This led to the creation of different 
systems, each of which provides for its own particular calculation methods and its own target 
group. Starting from 2004 a certain number of separate reductions in employer contributions 
were harmonised and reorganised into a single reduction in contributions made up of two 
types of reductions: a structural reduction and a reduction for ‘target groups’. The first 
reduction applies to all employers. The second only allows for reductions in contributions for 
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employers and/or employees who satisfy certain criteria. This reduction therefore encourages 
employers to take on new employees, in particular young persons with few qualifications, first-
time job-seekers, etc.  
 
The most recent Accord InterProfessionnel (AIP) aims to convert a large part of the financial 
resources - namely over 70% of the reductions in contributions - for ‘target groups’ into so-
called structural reductions in contributions. By doing so, the category of targeted measures 
will shrink more and more. It is the case that this category of ‘target group’ contributions was 
designed for the unemployment situation in the Brussels Capital Region: i.e. numerous young 
unemployed (with an unemployment rate exceeding 30% or even 50% in certain districts) with 
few qualifications. This reform will therefore deprive our Region of important tools that are 
tailored to its needs. 
 
Naturally, I am not disputing the aims of this reform. The main priority must be to simplify 
procedures for hiring staff in a generalised and drastic fashion. The objective of this 
simplification must be to simplify the system for employers, to try to remove the traps that the 
unemployed fall into, and to strengthen regional employment policies. It is advisable to 
simplify what are known as ‘target group measures’ and to provide more custom-made 
employment in the fight to remove the barriers to employment. Despite the simplification 
operation of 2004, the numerous employment plans remain a confused tangle of federal and 
regional measures (federal activation of benefits and reduced social security contributions, and 
regional grants for recruiting the unemployed).  What is more, grants are paid in a piecemeal 
fashion, which sometimes constitutes a problem on the ground, to the point that in certain 
situations there is a reverse effect which could actually create an unemployment trap. 
 
Again I wish to emphasise the lack of awareness of specific regional features in this field. 
Certain people use this example to argue that this matter should be regionalised. I am not one 
of those people, because here we are talking about reductions in social security contributions, 
which will have implications for the financing of the social security system. I am in any case 
convinced that it is possible to be effective and take more account of the specific features of the 
Regions by involving them in the definition, modification or elimination of target groups, 
while putting in place compensatory measures using employment activation policy. 
 
 
5.  Providing additional financial resources  
 
I would argue that the Brussels Capital Region should have financial means available to it in 
proportion to the heavy burdens that it takes on for the country as a whole. Our Region 
contributes 20% of Belgium’s gross GDP, represents 10% of the Belgian population, but only 
receives back 9% of personal income taxes. This is obviously not sufficient to meet the 
requirements and burdens of a Belgian and international capital city. Is it necessary to repeat 
that 500,000 people enter and leave our Region every day? It therefore seems to me to be 
imperative that if we are talking of stimuli and making the Regions more responsible, then we 
should first concentrate on correcting the structural under-financing of the Region and take 
into account criteria of distribution of resources that are suited to the specific conditions in 
Brussels. How can one imagine, for example, giving the Regions a more important role in 
terms of activation, something that requires a lot of additional staff, without transferring 
additional financial resources? 
 
What should our view be of the stance taken by two regional politicians, who are Ministers 
and participants in their role as negotiators in the institutional dialogue?  
 
This poses a challenge on several grounds. 
 
As regards the form of their statement, in the first place, their stance only takes very limited 
account of the Belgian reality since it does not incorporate the Brussels Capital Region, which 
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is an entirely distinct third Region and, most of all, the main employment catchment area in 
this country. Do we really need to repeat the highly paradoxical special nature of our Region: 
an economy that creates riches that represent more than 20% of GDP, a pool of 690,000 
official jobs, of which 357,000 are taken up by non-residents, and an unemployment rate 
approaching 20%... Perhaps this is because the authors have based their position on a 
deliberately ideological approach, given that they are two socialist leaders, who for that matter 
refer to the actions of the European Socialist Party.  
 
In addition, this declaration, which has not been the subject of consultation, has arisen within 
the context of difficult institutional negotiations with identifiable strategies, and has opened the 
way towards increased regionalisation of employment policies, even if the authors affirm that a 
number of matters should be retained at the federal level, while at the same time there are 
those who are fighting to retain the federal nature of this competence. It also opens up a 
breach in the principle of a financial mechanism that links ‘stimulus’ and ‘responsibility’ to a 
positive financial return for both the Regions and the Federal government on the investments 
that are made. The whole point is certainly how one defines what one means exactly by such a 
mechanism, the criteria that are likely to be taken into consideration, the degree of 
compulsion, and the precise nature of the penalties. 
 
Finally, this declaration, which claims to be one of principles, does not deal with details or 
special features, as the authors themselves admit, which could create risks within such a 
complex debate. The nuances are important. I am suspicious of slogans.   
 
At a basic level one has to say that this declaration does not look at all the elements which I 
have identified.  
 
Even if this declaration tends to support maintaining interpersonal solidarity while confirming 
that employment law, wages policies and social security (with all its pillars and financial 
mechanisms) must remain the responsibility of the federal government, it nonetheless opens 
up new possibilities without really showing how the existing tools could be made to work 
better, or how a fresh transfer of competences could generate greater efficiency.  
 
The same applies to general rules in the area of suitable employment and granting exemption 
from availability, which should, according to the two Ministers, remain federal matters, while 
they would have to be applied concretely at the regional level, with certain undertakings being 
made towards the federal government.  
 
This also applies in the areas of re-entry and employment measures, such as the ALEs/PWAs, 
outplacement, helping workers who are victims of restructuring, and rules for granting permits 
for temporary work, where the authors think it would be worth considering the advantages of 
regionalisation.  
 
The same applies to the rest, even more so when the authors argue in favour of regionalising 
what is ‘necessary’ for the Regions to perform their main mission in the employment field, 
without fixing any kind of reference points or limits.  
 
As regards financing, the authors have opened the way to giving the Regions more 
responsibility but without making a clear call for resources linked to competences to be 
transferred. 
 
In conclusion, as you will have understood, I am very keen to preserve a strong social security 
system as the cement that holds our country together, and not to envisage greater autonomy for 
the Regions, unless this increase in competences is needed to ensure greater effectiveness of 
the service provided to the population and more particularly to our job-seekers. It seems to me 
that this should be our main concern as regards our actions. I would also make a plea for 
improved coordination of the regional competences we already have available to us, for 
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example through cooperation agreements between the Regions. I would argue that it is 
necessary to take greater account of the special features of the Brussels Capital Region in the 
exercise of federal competences. Taking greater account of the special nature of our labour 
market will not necessarily happen by increasing regionalisation of competences. I am open to 
a discussion on whether to reinforce certain existing regional competences with a view to 
increased consistency and homogeneous policies, as well as greater involvement and 
therefore responsibilities for the Regions in certain areas. Finally, as regards finance, I would 
argue that the Brussels Capital Region should be given the financial means in proportion to 
the heavy burdens that it has to bear for the country as a whole.  
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Solidarity and responsibility 
 
Bea Cantillon, Centrum voor Sociaal Beleid Herman Deleeck, 
Universiteit Antwerpen 
 
 
 
Proponents of devolution of social security cite social transfers as a reason for splitting the 
social security system: social transfers are seen as an important impediment to economic 
convergence. Others believe that federalising social security would increase poverty in 
Wallonia and Brussels. Indeed, simulations demonstrated that halting social transfers from 
Flanders to Wallonia would dramatically increase the poverty rate in Wallonia in the short 
term.  
 
The first-order effects of eliminating interregional social transfers between Flanders and 
Wallonia suggest that social security – from the perspective of social efficiency – ought to 
remain a federal competence. This also ties in with the theory of fiscal federalism, according to 
which social redistribution is best organised at the central level of government. The underlying 
notion is that social redistribution will be pressurised if it is organised at a lower tier of 
government, because of labour and capital mobility.  
 
However, the logic of fiscal federalism conversely implies that, given that wage costs and social 
regulations are uniform throughout the federation, possible differences in the economic 
dynamism between regions will be artificially maintained. In Belgium, the development of 
comparative advantages and the mobility of labour and capital and – thus an economic 
convergence of the regions – may be impeded by the prevailing system of universal social 
protection. The latter argument is heard increasingly often in the debate on the position of 
social security within Belgian federalism. The question is, however, to what extent federalising 
the social security system will lead to diverging social safety nets in the regions and a substantial 
reduction in the cost of labour in Wallonia. Theoretically, a devolved social security system 
would allow Wallonia to cut taxes and social security contributions (and thus to reduce the cost 
of labour). As such a measure would inevitably lead to a dramatic increase in poverty, it would 
appear to be an unlikely political option.  
 
On the other hand, there are good arguments in favour of extended regional competences 
within a single federal social security system. Principles such as localness (close-knit solidarity), 
suitability (the fact that regions have different needs and preferences) and efficiency (the fact 
that accountability will result in cost saving and that a smaller territorial scope creates more 
room for policy innovation) suggest that federalising social policy further may generate better 
outcomes. The Belgian case provides some important examples in this respect, Labour market 
policy is certainly one of them. 
 
Social security, as an instrument of interpersonal redistribution, regions should be made fully 
aware of their financial accountability for federalised policy strategies. All Community 
competences touching directly or indirectly upon the federal social security system should be 
the subject of consultation between the competent authorities. Where appropriate, the regions 
should be granted competence over certain social security resources (e.g. PWA, outplacement) 
– to be allocated to the Communities using a well-considered distribution code – so that they 
could be spent in accordance with local needs. In view of the major socioeconomic differences 
between the Communities and the growing policy divergences in the fields of labour, care and 
education, it is necessary to align the various policy levels more closely. Europe’s approved 
‘Open Method of Coordination’, whereby common objectives are formulated, indicators 
defined and policy strategies exchanged, could serve as a useful example in this respect.  
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Decentralisation of Labour Market 
Policy May Matter, But Other 
Reforms Matter More 
Bart Cockx, Sherppa, Ghent University 
Bruno Van der Linden, FNRS and IRES, UCLouvain 
 
 
Essentially, we agree with the key point of view of ministers Marcourt and Vandenbroucke. If 
“labour market policy” is restricted to “active labour market policies” (ALMP), aiming at the 
(re)integration of unemployed workers and at the preservation and enhancement of the 
employability of the active population, further regionalization can indeed make policy more 
coherent and therefore less costly. Nevertheless, even if ALMP should in principle be 
regionalized, in practise this involves a number of complications, which, if not resolved, could 
make the regionalization counterproductive. We will point to a number of these problems. 
More fundamentally, we argue that, before reflecting on the regionalization of labour market 
policy, we should first step back and reflect on the optimal design of labour market institutions, 
independently of the issue of decentralization. Labour market institutions include formal 
organizations, laws, rules and policies that affect the functioning of the labour market. To our 
opinion, to overcome the huge demographic and economic challenges that we currently face, 
a comprehensive reform of these institutions matters much more than the decentralization of 
labour market policy. Within the limits of this paper, we focus on the design of the 
employment protection legislation (EPL) and of unemployment insurance (UI). We restrict 
our attention to EPL and UI because the optimal design of these institutions are directly 
related to that of ALMP, which lends itself to regionalization. This does not mean, however, that 
we regard reforms of other labour market institutions, such as the (early) retirement schemes, wage 
formation, minimum wages and the regulation of migration flows as less important. 
 
1. A fundamental reform of EPL and UI 
The current EPL and UI were set up in an economic environment in which relationships 
between workers and firms were typically long lasting and stable. The increasing globalisation 
of the economy and the rapid technological and organisational changes require more flexibility 
of both workers and firms leading to career paths which are much more volatile both within 
and between firms. Current institutions must be therefore urgently reformed to reconcile this 
new need of more flexibility with that of security for workers. The call for “flexicurity” is not 
new, but there is no unanimity on the corresponding institutional model it implies. In a 
nutshell, we propose the following guidelines for reform, justified in a companion document 
(Cockx and Van der Linden, 2009).  
Transform the bulk of current advance notice payments into a unique lay-off contribution, 
independently of the type of worker (blue or white-collar) and type of contract (temporary or 
open-ended). A small severance payment is due to cover the “psychic costs” related to dismissal 
(defined in the companion document). In order to make the employer accountable for the 
costs he imposes on society, the lay-off contribution should be made proportional to the 
cumulative past earnings since the moment that the worker was hired in the firm. This 
contribution would be used not only to finance a supplement to the current unemployment 
benefits, but also, as to make the worker more accountable, to finance ALMP for the 
unemployed. Aside of this scheme, it makes sense to generalise the current scheme of 
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temporary unemployment benefits for blue-collar workers to white-collar workers, but only to 
the extent that one introduces “experience rating” in the funding, so that again the employers 
are made accountable for the social costs that they induce by these temporary lay-offs. 
To the extent that the Regional authorities are competent with regards ALMP, the additional 
funding generated by the lay-off tax can partially be used as an additional funding of Regional 
policy. However, the Regions should not be funded according to the proceeds of the lay-off 
taxes (nor on the basis of an indicator of Regional unemployment). Rather, in order to provide 
correct incentives they should receive a lump-sum amount plus a variable part that is positively 
related to the increase in the employment rate realised within the Region, but negatively to the 
average increase observed in neighbouring countries. We return to this incentive scheme 
below. 
 
2. Decentralised labour market policy: principles and difficulties 
The starting point of ministers Marcourt and Vandenbroucke is that labour regulations, wage 
policy and the funding of Social Insurance and all its branches should remain within the 
competence of the federal authority. This is completely in line with the arguments expressed 
in Van der Linden (2008) which we both completely subscribe and which we don’t repeat 
here. Remaining federal does not mean that no reforms are needed but discussing all of them 
is beyond the scope of this paper (some are developed in Van der Linden, 2008). 
Moreover, we agree that it makes sense to transfer a number of competences which currently 
still are at the federal level, but which logically are part of a competency that has been 
transferred to the Regional level. These concern essentially ALMP that aim at reintegrating 
unemployed and inactive workers in the labour market. These include the variety of training 
and counselling programmes, and intermediation services. An optimal allocation of ALMP can 
only be realized to the extent that the coherent set of policy instruments are grouped within 
one authority level. Establishing a precise list of the policies that should be regionalized is 
beyond the scope of the present paper.8 To avoid counter-productive effects, this can only be 
done by considering each policy in turn and by looking very carefully at the implications of 
decentralization. Then, the same exercise should be made for the group of regionalized 
policies taken together. 
 
Targeted wage subsidies  
More delicate is whether the Regions should be made responsible for the targeted wage 
subsidies9 and for the monitoring and sanctioning of job search, of job acceptance behaviour 
and of mandatory participation in ALMP. We now consider these two groups of policies in 
turn.  
One argues that federal wage subsidies directed to specific target groups should be 
regionalized, because this allows to accommodate these subsidies to the Regional labour 
market conditions. An example to support this point of view and that is often repeated in public 
opinion is that Wallonia and Brussels have a problem of youth employment while the 
employment rate of older workers is too low in Flanders. The problem would be resolved if 
each Region could target the wage subsidy according to its needs.  
This argument is flawed for at least three reasons. First, as documented in Van der Linden 
(2008), all regions have a problem of low employment of both youth and older workers (if the 
Regional average is the reference). The difference between the Regions is a matter of relative 
importance. Second, if the federal legislation entitles both youth and older workers to targeted 
                                                       
8 The position paper of the ministers asks for a complete regionalization of training and educational policies that are 
up to now still federal. They also mention other policies that should be considered for a regionalization: the 
ALE/PWA, outplacement, temporary work permits… Even though collective bargaining remains federal, one 
should maintain a role for social partners in case of a regionalization of these instruments.   
9 Contrary to Vandenbroucke (2008), the position paper of the ministers does not ask for such a reform.  
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wage subsidies, then each Region will benefit from these subsidies in proportion to the number 
of beneficiaries: in Wallonia and Brussels, there will be proportionally more youth who will be 
subsidised, in Flanders more older workers. Finally and more fundamentally, one may 
question whether targeted subsides to youth and older workers are effective policy tools. It is 
our opinion that the exclusion of these groups from labour market participation is more linked 
to other reasons (notably, existing forms of labour market protection, seniority rules in wage 
ladders and the existing early retirement schemes). We believe that a reform of labour market 
protection along the aforementioned lines (coupled with a much more restrictive use of early 
retirement schemes) will be much more effective in integrating these target groups into the 
labour market.  
This does not mean that targeted wage subsidies are not useful at all. In previous research (e.g. 
Cockx et al. 2005a, b) we have repeatedly pleaded for an intensification of the structural 
reduction of employer contributions for low wage-workers in which one could accommodate 
for the increasing relationship between wages and age (Van der Linden 2005). In addition, we 
have shown that temporary wage subsidies for (young) long-term unemployed workers may be 
effective. As far as we know, this conclusion cannot rigorously be extended to other 
demographic groups in Belgium. 
If it makes sense to regionalise any subsidy, it would be the temporary targeted subsidies.10 The 
reason is that this form of subsidy could be regarded as a substitute to other ALMP. Since the 
latter are already a Regional competence, it makes sense that the Region could decide upon 
the optimal policy mix it provides. Moreover, to the extent that this competence is limited to 
the temporary subsidies there is less risk of engaging in a fiscal competition between the 
Regions. This also justifies maintaining the competence of all structural labour cost reductions 
at the federal level. Note that this implies that we oppose the current possibility of Regions to 
offer a tax exemption to all employees living in a particular Region (the “jobkorting” in 
Flanders).11 This opens the door to fiscal competition. If one believes that such measures are 
useful, they should be decided upon at the federal level. 
 
Monitoring of job search 
We agree with ministers Marcourt and Vandenbroucke that it makes sense to regionalize the 
monitoring and sanctioning of job search, of job acceptance behaviour and of mandatory 
participation in ALMP’s: (i) the Regional unemployment agencies ("UA’s") enter in direct 
contact with the unemployed and are therefore better informed than the federal UA on the 
effort is exerted to escape unemployment; (ii) it isn’t cost effective, as currently, that these tasks 
are divided between the two agencies. By the way, Regional UA's can already automatically 
induce a sanction if the information transmitted to the Federal UI agency is a withdrawal from 
the register of insured unemployed. Nevertheless, if one assigns the complete responsibility of 
monitoring to the Regional UA’s, then two complications must be resolved. First, there is a risk 
that the function of counselling and intermediation conflicts with that of monitoring and 
sanctioning if they have to be realized within the same organization (Van der Linden, 2009). 
We need not forget that the separation in 1978 of the federal UA into two services resulted 
from the difficulty of integrating intermediation and monitoring within one service 
(Palsterman 2003). Second, the Regional UA’s will under-invest in both the monitoring and 
the services they provide to unemployed if they are not financially rewarded for the savings they 
generate in terms of reduced unemployment benefit payments by the federal UA. This brings 
us to the proposal of ministers Marcourt and Vandenbroucke to design an appropriate funding 
scheme that internalises the external benefits of its actions to the federal UA. 
                                                       
10 To a small extent, Regions have already implemented their own temporary wage subsidies. Currently, federal 
temporary targeted subsidies mainly are the so-called activation of unemployment benefits and the temporary 
reductions in social security contributions (whose importance has been much reduced by the inter-sectoral 
collective agreement 2009-10). 
11 Recall that for economists it does not matter which side of the market is taxed. Cuts in income taxation can 
eventually be translated into reductions in the wage cost. 
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Incentive funding 
To the extent that the Regional monitoring activity and their ALMP improve the matching 
between job seekers and job vacancies and so eventually increases employment, the Regional 
UA’s generate a positive externality on the federal budget. Outlays on unemployment benefits 
are so reduced and tax receipts increased.12 It makes therefore sense to reward the Regions for 
this positive externality. A simple way of realising this objective is to introduce a transfer from 
the federal authorities to the Regions that is positively related to both the average savings per 
full-time equivalent employed worker and the Regional full-time equivalent employment rate. It 
makes more sense to relate it to the employment rate than to an indicator of the 
unemployment rate, since this avoids the adverse incentive of rewarding the Regions by 
pushing unemployed workers into inactivity.   
We should refine the incentive pay scheme such that it rewards only changes in the 
employment rate that are a consequence of the actions undertaken by the Region.13 Van der 
Linden (2008) discusses at length the complications of identifying an outcome indicator that 
correctly reflects the savings generated by the Regional employment policy rather than other 
factors. Here we follow a more constructive and pragmatic approach by defining a refinement 
of the above-mentioned indicator that is far from perfect, but that remains relatively simple, 
while taking a number of essential complications into account.  
First, the employment rate is probably more affected by the business cycle than by the 
Regional policy actions. For instance, without any correction for the current worldwide 
economic crisis, the incentive pay would sanction all the Regions, even if they were not 
responsible for the fall in the employment rate. We therefore propose to relate the reward to 
the difference between the Regional and the average employment rate in the neighbouring 
countries.14 Second, the scheme should reward and sanction current and not past policy as to 
avoid that the scheme would sanction the Regions who did not perform well in the past. 
Therefore, it’s important to normalise the transfer at some negotiated starting date. This implies 
that for a given employment rate the Walloon Region could receive a higher transfer than the 
Flemish Region if Wallonia realizes higher employment growth than in Flanders. The scheme 
could nevertheless take into account that it’s more difficult to increase the employment rate by 
one percentage point if the initial level is higher in one Region than in the other. Finally, some 
workers living in one Region will find employment in another Region. This raises a 
complicated question of which Region is responsible for the employment realized in another 
Region. Is it the sending Region, e.g. by providing appropriate training or search incentives to 
its unemployed workers? Or is the employment the consequence of the Regional provision of 
adequate infrastructure and other favourable conditions for employment creation by firms? 
Since it is difficult to assign a correct weighting for each of the factors, we propose to use an 
adjusted employment rate in the incentive pay scheme. In the adjusted employment rate the 
transfer would be calculated such that a worker living in one region and working in the other 
would contribute for 50% to the employment rate where she lives and for the other 50% to the 
employment rate of the Region where she works. Obviously, this is a first proposal that may 
require more reflection before it’s implemented. 
   
                                                       
12 The increase in tax receipts currently only affect the Regional receipts to a limited extent. 
13 Note that this incentive pay scheme could be partially financed by the lay-off contribution of the reform 
mentioned in Section 1. A deep revision of the "trekkingsrechten/droits de triage" is also recommended (Van 
der Linden, 2008). 
14 An alternative would be to relate it the employment rate of the country. By doing so, the incentive scheme 
would, however, become a zero-sum game in which the best performing Region(s) would be always be 
rewarded and the worst performing Regions would be sanctioned. One could imagine, however, that all Regions 
perform well, in that their policy results in a growing employment rate, even if one region may relatively 
perform better than the other. Relating the employment norm to the neighbouring countries avoids a zero-sum 
game, which makes sense in this context, because it’s absolute and not relative performance that matters. Note, 
any aggregate benchmark can suffer from imperfections due to differences in compositions (according to, say, 
sector of activity or demographic characteristics). Ideally, on should try to correct for these differences. 
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3. Conclusion 
To face the challenges induced by the economic and demographic crisis we currently need an 
ambitious reform of labour market institutions and, in particular, of the employment 
protection legislation (EPL) for which we provide some guidelines in a companion document 
(Cockx and Van der Linden, 2009). The reform of EPL is much more important than the 
decentralisation of labour market policy. This does not mean that decentralization, if properly 
designed, cannot bring efficiency gains. In this perspective, the joint proposal of ministers 
Marcourt and Vandenbroucke goes in the right direction. Still, we argued that a number of 
these gains are uncertain and crucially depend on their precise implementation. 
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A comment on Marcourt and 
Vandenbroucke’s call for action in 
the interest of economic recovery 
and social progress 
 
Mathias Dewatripont15, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and 
Management and ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles 
 
 
 
In my view, this Marcourt-Vandenbroucke (hereafter MV) text is more than welcome. In fact, 
when I read it in the newspaper in December 2008, I thought it was a real source of hope, after 
such a long period of immobility in the political debates about institutional reforms that started 
right after the 2007 elections. The really disappointing news is that things do not seem to have 
progressed on this front while we are already at the end of March and everybody gets focused 
on the upcoming regional elections. I fear that the failure to move on the basis of this text 
constitutes a missed opportunity for all those who would want to convince voters that this 
country has not become unmanageable. My hope is that political parties will be able to make 
progress along the lines of the MV text after June 2009.  
 
In terms of substance, I agree with the basic assumptions and main objectives of the MV text, 
and I also agree with its main proposal.16 As such, the MV text is understandably short on 
details in some dimensions, and I will elaborate a bit on these at the end of my comment. 
 
As far as assumptions are concerned, the MV text takes as given the need for institutional 
reforms in this country, to promote efficiency while maintaining solidarity. I agree with this 
view, because: (i) there is wide consensus within Flanders about the need for reforms, and this 
cannot be negated forever if one wants to keep this country together; (ii) of course, in order to 
obtain an agreement, one also needs to reassure French-speaking Belgium about the 
maintenance of interpersonal solidarity; and (iii) in turn, this requires credible mechanisms to 
ensure that federated entities manage to gradually “converge” so that solidarity is not forever 
unidirectional as far as cross-regional flows are concerned. 
 
The MV text stresses the labour market as first priority. This is quite right, because the main 
reason for the economic imbalance between our federated entities concerns employment and 
unemployment rates. If Brussels and Wallonia had the same employment rates as Flanders,17 
there would be no significant “financial transfer” between them any more.18 Moreover, given 
that regional labour markets have very different outcomes, it makes sense to think about 
decentralizing some labour market policies. 
 
                                                       
15 I thank Antonio Estache for useful comments. 
16 In fact, it is very consistent with proposals put forward in January 2008 by 120 academic economists from all 
over Belgium: “Reforming the Belgian institutions: Combining flexibility and coordination”; the French version of 
this text will be republished in a special issue of Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique entitled “Wallonie et 
Bruxelles – Analyses et Enjeux” to appear in April 2009. 
17 Instead of the current rates of around 65% in Flanders versus 55-56% in Brussels and Wallonia. 
18 I leave aside here the issue of whether transfers should be computed on the basis of GNP or GDP, which is 
crucial to consider the relative “contributions” of Brussels and Flanders. 
 27 
Which policies should be decentralized? The MV text argues for keeping labour law, wage 
setting and welfare state provisions federal, and for decentralizing active labour market policies 
and training. Conceptually, this seems a reasonable balance between efficiency and equity, 
even if the devil can be in the details here, and labour market experts should be brought in to 
comment on the fine-tuning of the system. 
 
One question these proposals beg concerns their real expected impact: how much convergence 
can we hope to obtain if we follow them? This will in fact depend on the resulting actual 
labour market policies chosen by public authorities. And here the MV text suggests coupling 
decentralization with an incentive scheme conducive to Governmental “responsibility” so that 
to insure a “positive return for the regions as well as the federal state”.  
 
This idea makes a lot of sense: all levels of Government should have incentives to tackle much 
more vigorously our labour market problems.19 Of course, this is a politically hot issue, and it is 
maybe not surprising that the MV text is really short on details on this topic. My feeling is that 
this question should be addressed explicitly, namely with well-defined targets and bonus-malus 
components in case of deviations with respect to these targets.  
 
Once again, the devils will be in the details. Work needs to be done to make investigate 
“sustainable scenarios”. Let me just offer here a few remarks:20 
 
1. First, on French-speaking side, where concerns exist with respect to such bonus-malus 
mechanisms, one should consider their benefits in terms of ‘commitment devices’, 
which will build momentum to focus policies on raising employment rates (just like the 
Maastricht criteria helped improve the state of Belgian public finances). 
 
2. Second, one should define ‘neutral’ initial employment rate targets,21 maintaining 
current solidarity levels, as well as ‘reasonable’ objectives in terms of speed of 
convergence. These objectives will be the subject of intense political debates, and the 
same will be true for the size of the bonus-malus in case of deviations from this path.  
 
3. Note that I assume objectives in terms of labour market outcomes, not in terms of 
policies, since the idea is to decentralize policies. However, one should avoid ‘vicious 
circles’ in case a region fails to meet its objectives and starts losing money as a result, 
which may hamper its ability to undertake adequate labour market policies. One may 
therefore want to consider malusses in terms of obligations to intensify labour market 
policies rather than in terms of reduced financial resources. 
 
4. Finally, one should limit the randomness of such mechanisms for the regional public 
finances. This means filtering out as much as possible risks that are beyond the control 
of policymakers, for example, the current deterioration of employment rates due to the 
international financial crisis. Since such events typically affect all Belgian regions at the 
same time, going for some form of ‘relative performance evaluation’ is the natural 
solution. One should make sure however that the system remains ‘win-win’, namely that 
every entity (federal and federated) actually benefits financially when employment rates 
improve in any one region.  
 
                                                       
19 Of course, the relevant concept in this debate is that of ‘structural underemployment and/or unemployment’, 
not the big cyclical component of unemployment that we are starting to witness right now because of the 
financial crisis; this latter one has to be dealt with by macroeconomic policy coordinated at EU and even world 
level. 
20 These remarks are further developed in an article entitled “Gouvernance francophone « responsable », 
condition d’une politique socio-économique efficace et solidaire en Belgique?”, to be published in a special issue 
of Reflets et Perspectives de la Vie Economique entitled “Wallonie et Bruxelles – Analyses et Enjeux” in April 2009. 
21 Employment targets are attractive because they are more comprehensive and less ‘manipulable’ than 
unemployment targets or, worse, long-term unemployment targets. 
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Putting together a system which decentralizes active labour market policies and training and 
incentivizes federated entities is a good way to introduce a commitment device to improve 
employment rates and thereby make interregional solidarity sustainable. It will moreover also 
focus political energy on improving education systems, another key issue for employability, 
especially in Brussels and Wallonia. Designing such an incentive system is not technically 
trivial, but it can be done in a way which is truly “win-win”. It would be politically very 
desirable if one wants to preserve Belgian solidarity while favouring efficiency.   
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Should the setting of wages in 
Belgium be regionalized? 
 
Robert Plasman, DULBEA, Université Libre de Bruxelles 
Michael Rusinek, DULBEA and Central Economic Council22 
François Rycx, CEB, DULBEA and IZA-Bonn 
Ilan Tojerow, DULBEA and IZA-Bonn 
 
 
 
Within the debate over the relationship between the structure of wage bargaining and 
economic performances in Europe, the issue of regional dimension returns in a recurring way. 
The discussion often relates to the capacity of wage-setting systems to take into account the 
important economic disparities between regions. Pench et al. (1999) support for example that a 
uniform fixation of wages across regions would not be adapted to local job markets. According 
to Davies and Hallet (2001), the important regional differences in unemployment observed in 
numerous European countries are due to the incapacity of the wage-setting systems to take into 
account the levels of productivity of the least productive regions.23 The predominance of 
national industry bargaining, in a large number of European countries, could explain this 
phenomenon. Accordingly, two types of answers are generally proposed in order to take into 
account the local environment in the establishment of wages. The first, supported by the 
European Commission (Davies and Hallet, 2001) and the OECD (OECD, 2006), consists of 
decentralizing wage bargaining towards the company level. The second, which is at the heart 
of current negotiations relative to a de-federalization of employment policy in Belgium, 
consists of regionalizing wage bargaining. 
 
In their joint “call for action and dialogue for economic recovery and social progress”, 
Ministers Frank Vandenbroucke and Jean-Claude Marcourt clearly indicate that the Belgian 
wage policy should remain a federal competence. This is an important statement as it implies 
that wage setting in Belgium should not be regionalized. In what follows, we explain why we 
share their point of view and suggest alternative ways to increase the sensitivity of wages in 
Belgium to local (and in particular regional) conditions if it turned out to be necessary. 
 
Partisans for the regionalization of wage bargaining argue that the actual wage-setting system in 
Belgium (inter-professional agreement, followed by industry agreements, and eventually 
followed by firm-level agreements) is not flexible enough to take into account the regional 
differences in productivity. They also indicate that negotiations at the Walloon level would be 
more sensitive to unemployment and would thus involve lower wages for this region. 
 
To assess whether the setting of wages in Belgium should be regionalized, it is interesting to 
focus first on other countries’ experience. Within European countries, only Spain and 
Germany present a regionalized formation of wages. In Spain, Simón et al. (2006) note 
important variations in wages between regions as well as in wages agreed at the industry level as 
in actual paid wages. They deduce from this that the regional character of industry bargaining 
allows for a differentiation of wages between regions. However, these wage differences do not 
seem to fully reflect local conditions because of the phenomenon of inter-regional imitation 
within one same industry (Bande et al., 2008). In the case of Germany, the regional differences 
                                                       
22 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the 
Central Economic Council. 
23 Other factors such as differences in economic development, labour qualification and the lack of geographic 
mobility can also cause differences in unemployment between regions. (Davies et Hallet, 2001) 
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in industry agreed wages are rather weak although wage bargaining is held at the Landers level. 
The strongly coordinated character of wage bargaining between trade-union confederations 
and employer associations could explain this situation (Schnabel, 1999). The idea that the 
level of regional wage differentials depends on the degree of centralisation/coordination of 
wage bargaining is also supported by Vamvakidis (2008). The latter analyzes the relation 
between the degree of centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining24 and the regional wage 
differentials in 10 European countries between 1980 and 2000. He finds a negative relation 
between the degree of centralisation/coordination of wage bargaining and the level of regional 
wage differentials. To sum up, empirical evidence suggests that regionalization of wage 
bargaining is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for generating high levels of 
regional wage differences. It seems in fact, in this debate, that the regional character of the 
wage-setting systems brings less than the degree of centralisation/coordination of wage 
bargaining. 
 
Another way to evaluate the pertinence of the regionalization of wages is to examine potential 
consequences for Belgium highlighted in recent studies. According to Bogaert (2008), a 
regionalization of wages would remove the moderating influence of “francophone” 
unemployment on Flemish wages. This would increase wages in Flanders and, through 
demonstration, generate similar wage increases in Wallonia. The final result would be a higher 
increase of wages than in the current federal system. This phenomenon seems to be occurring 
in Spain where bargaining is already regionalized (Bande et al., 2008). Deschamps (2003) 
suggests that a regionalization of wage bargaining would also increase the complexity of the 
system and lead to administrative costs for firms that have production sites in more than one 
region. Moreover, he argues that a regionalization of wages would pave the way to the 
regionalization of social security. It would seem incoherent to restrict regionalization solely to 
wages, and not to total labour costs. Therefore, the contributions to social security, which 
represent a large part of the total labour costs, would also be regionalized. This could, finally, 
affect the level of social security spending in the different regions. 
 
Several recent studies have examined whether the current system of wage formation in 
Belgium is capable of taking into account the regional levels of productivity (Dejemeppe and 
Van der Linden, 2006; Plasman et al., 2007; Joskin et al., 2008). Their results indicate that the 
average labour productivity is lower in Wallonia and that regional wage differentials are smaller 
than regional differences in productivity. Yet, Plasman et al. (2008) show that regional wage 
differentials and regional productivity differences are positively correlated within joint 
committees25. Moreover, their results indicate that this correlation is stronger in decentralized 
joint committees (whereby company-specific agreements have a significant impact on the wage 
setting) and in joint committees already sub-divided along a local line (i.e., subdivided in 
regional sub-joint committees). These results thus suggest that it is the possibility to negotiate 
wages at the company level and the existence of regional sub-joint committees that allow wages 
to adapt to regional productivity differences. 
 
Overall, more research is needed on whether wages in Belgium are sufficiently sensitive to 
local (and in particular regional) specificities (Du Caju et al., 2008; Rusinek and Rycx, 2008). 
Yet, if it turned out that this is not the case, we would recommend to increase the possibility of 
negotiating wages at the company level and to facilitate the creation of regional sub-joint 
committees. This solution would have the advantage of avoiding increasing administrative 
complexities in joint committees where a more important wage differential is not necessary. 
Moreover, the decision to increase the weight of company-specific agreements or to subdivide 
joint committees would be taken by the national joint committees, composed of members 
close to the reality on the field. In addition, these mechanisms would not only allow to take 
                                                       
24 Measured by the OECD index taking into account the prevailing bargaining level and the formal or informal 
coordination between trade unions and employers. 
25 Joint committees are permanent bodies at the industry level in which employers' associations and trade unions 
are represented. Their main task is to oversee the conclusion of industry collective agreements by the 
organizations represented. 
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into account differences between regions but equally differences between provinces, labour 
pools or companies. Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that regionalization of wage 
bargaining could create a higher increase in wages than in the current national system, and 
could open the path to the regionalization of the social security. In conclusion, it appears that 
the current system already contains the mechanisms that allow for regional differences in 
productivity to be reflected in wages. It is therefore not certain that a regionalization of the 
wage setting system is necessary. 
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Regional Labour Market Policies: 
Scope and Limits in a Federal State 
 
Paul Van Rompuy, em.prof., CES, KULeuven 
 
 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
It goes without saying that labour markets are, much more than any other market, intimately 
embedded in the overall national institutional framework. This holds in particular for the 
European continental labour markets, characterized by a relatively high degree of social 
protection. This fact implies that decentralization or a “regionalization” of labour market 
policies in a federal setting, motivated by economic efficiency grounds needs to be evaluated 
by equity considerations. The latter refer to, i.e. the equal treatment of identical citizens in 
comparable socio-economic situations, including their equal access to social protection. This 
constraint on the devolution of federal policies inspired the shaping of the federal system in 
Belgium and in other European post-war federal states. 
 
The close connection between working conditions  ( hours, retirement age …) , social rights 
acquired during involuntary inactive spells of time and the entitlement to legal pensions , 
unemployment benefits and replacement income during periods of illness, necessarily imply a 
uniform federal legal framework, that is at the heart of the social security system.  
 
Because of the low degree of interregional labour mobility and of the striking and persistent 
differences between regional unemployment rates, one can hardly perceive the Belgian labour 
market as one, integrated market in contrast to e.g. the more homogeneous labour market in 
the Netherlands. This feature inspires the idea to regionalize some aspects of labour market 
policies in order to deal with the specific regional hard core problems in a more efficient way. 
Some of these aspects that are actually debated on the political forum will be briefly discussed 
in the sequel. 
 
 
2. Unemployment Benefits 
2.1 Efficiency and Redistributive Aspects. 
 
Negative shocks hitting all or some regions and resulting in an increase of the unemployment 
rate(s), can be distinguished according to their transitory or permanent nature. A business cycle 
downturn hits all regions and represents a transitory negative shock, although its 
unemployment effect may differ regionally. The specific industrial pattern of a region, e.g. the 
importance of the car assembly sector and of related suppliers in Flanders, may as a result of a 
worldwide restructuring, either lead to a transitory period of higher unemployment or to a 
prolonged distressed regional labour market. The flexibility of the regional labour market, the 
performance of the regional intermediation agencies and the emergence of new economic 
activities will make the difference. 
 
It is, from an insurance point of view, efficient to pool social risks due to transitory negative 
shocks that hit all regions or that are specific for some regions. “Pooling” social risks implies a 
federal insurance system, financed basically by employee and employers’ contributions. On the 
other hand, permanent negative shocks that cover several business cycles and lead to persistent 
(or “structural”) high levels of unemployment in some regions cannot be efficiently insured. 
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They therefore call on an interregional redistributive mechanism, organized at the federal level 
and sustained by federal subsidies. The redistributive dimension of the unemployment benefit 
system is deeply embedded in our social security system, although its relative weight in total 
social expenditure could be reduced by a more efficient organization of labour market policies.  
 
The pure insurance as well as the redistributive dimension of the unemployment benefit 
system is subject to the well known moral hazard problem at the level of the insured. But due 
to the specific Belgian situation, created by the 1980 constitutional reform, an additional moral 
hazard problem arises. Since then, the financing, regulation and sanctioning functions have 
been maintained at the federal level (with the RVA –ONEM), whereas labour market 
intermediation, monitoring and training functions have been transferred to the regional 
Employment Agencies (EA). Because it is not evident that the latter do take the federal 
insurer’s budget constraint into account, an incentive problem may arise at the regional level. 
Several proposals to increase the accountability of the regional EPs have been put forward in 
the recent past. 
 
 
2.2 Incentive Schemes for the Regions 
 
2.2.1 If the principle of equal access to social protection for the insured in identical situations 
applies, irrespective of their region of residence or of work place, unemployment benefits 
should be maintained uniformly across all regions. In addition, the strict adherence to the 
“level playing field” principle for firms implies uniform employers’ contribution rates as well. 
 
The difference between the unemployment impact of negative transitory shocks and of 
permanent ones is to a large extent reflected in the time span of uninterrupted average spells of 
unemployment. In addition of the impact of these negative demand shocks, regional labour 
supply characteristics as well as relatively high labour costs- as compared to labour productivity 
of the job seekers- result in regionally specific pockets of long term unemployed. Young, low 
skilled unemployed and older (50 +) job seekers fall into this category. But as shown by Van 
der Linden (e.g. 2008), the unfavourable gap between their acquired skills and their labour 
costs appears to be more important than their age profile. The common feature of these two 
groups is their long spell of unemployment, i.e. more than one year. The probability of finding 
a suitable job drops dramatically to zero after this initial uninterrupted spell of unemployment. 
Hence, unemployment benefits for these categories are more of a redistributive nature, as 
compared to the pure insurance dimension of the system. 
In view of their large share of the Belgian unemployed population, i.e. 50.4 % in 2007, which 
substantially exceeds the EU-15 average of 40.5 % for the same year (Eurostat data), it is clear 
that a high priority should be given to them in the active labour market policies (LMP). The 
striking regional differences (2007 data)  of their respective share in total unemployment, 
reaching about 57 %  in the Brussels Capital Region and in Wallonia, as compared to Flanders 
( 37,5 %), suggest a regional specific policy mix.  
 
 
2.2.2  The most simple incentive scheme for the long term unemployed could be based on their 
regional (average) number during a reference period, agreed on by all regions. The economies 
in terms of benefit expenditure at the federal level would flow to the region in which the yearly 
average number of long term unemployed decreases on condition that the period of 
continuous employment exceeds x months. The transfer in favour of the region should 
preferably be earmarked, i.e. only used for active labour market policies. If the employment is 
situated in a region, different from the region of residence, the “bonus” could be subject to a 
sharing rule. Although the derived fiscal gains of an increased regional employment rate 
exceed the economies in terms of reduced unemployment benefits, the former should remain 
at the federal level in order to finance its rising ageing costs and the burden of its debt. 
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Symmetrical to the bonus, a penalty or “malus” is conceivable if the regional number of long 
term unemployed increases substantially in a given year. However, the practical 
implementation of a penalty system is hindered by the occurrence of unforeseen, regionally 
specific negative shocks that can be evaluated only ex post and that could be subject to 
divergent interpretations, drawing the incentive scheme into endless discussions. 
 
2.2.3 A preferable and more realistic incentive scheme should be based on regional overall 
employment rate targets, defined over a medium term time span. In this way, the incentive 
scheme fits into the federal employment policy, aiming at substantially increasing the 
employment rate in order to cope with the forthcoming ageing issue. The employment rate 
targets should be conditioned on national growth forecasts translated into regional growth 
forecasts and their derived employment elasticity. For each year of the forecast period, the 
federal forecasted economies in terms of unemployment benefits could be allocated to the 
regions and corrected for ex post in a positive or negative sense. The use of employment rate 
targets over unemployment rate goals, also avoids classification issues of the unemployed 
decided on by the regional EA (e.g. according to their appreciation of suitable job 
opportunities). Clearly, such an incentive schema should be part of a cooperation agreement 
between the regions and the federal government and evaluated periodically. In addition, it 
does not exclude periodical audits of the regional EA by the federal insurer (RVA-ONEM) of 
their performance.  
 
2.2.4. Since the characteristics of the long term unemployed differ substantially between 
regions, regionally specific employment incentives (for the unemployed as well as for the 
employers) should be allowed for in the framework of the federal budget for LMP. But in order 
to prevent interregional competition between firms for workers in times of labour scarcity, the 
conditions for granting these incentives, including maximum levels or rates, should be part of 
an overall federal legal framework. Moreover, it is conceivable to transfer the total budget for 
LMP measures in a reference year,(i.e. exclusive of the federally financed unemployment 
benefit component and the costs of the EA’s services), which amounted to about .89 % of GDP 
in 2006, (Eurostat data, categories 2 to 7) to the regions and make them financially 
accountable for future increases. In this way, the regions can apply the appropriate active 
labour market policy mix, within the limits of the cooperation agreement. 
 
2.2.5 A final remark bears on the close link between regional incentives for target groups, e.g. 
older workers, and the federal early retirement scheme. The latter, although overhauled   in the 
so called “ generation pact”, still invites employers to shed older workers ( 55+) , which 
conflicts with incentive schemes designed  for this group. An adjustment of the early 
retirement scheme in view of the ageing challenge would therefore render federal and regional 
employment policies more efficient and reduce the burden of the redistributive aspects of the 
unemployment insurance system. 
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